Case Western Reserve Law Review
Volume 6

Issue 3

Article 7

1955

Appellate Procedure
Clare D. Russell

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/caselrev
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Clare D. Russell, Appellate Procedure, 6 W. Rsrv. L. Rev. 214 (1955)
Available at: https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/caselrev/vol6/iss3/7

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Student Journals at Case Western Reserve University
School of Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Case Western Reserve Law Review by an
authorized administrator of Case Western Reserve University School of Law Scholarly Commons.

WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW

(Spring

and then leave the car at a garage for repairs. On the way to the garage
the friend deviated from the direct route for his own purposes, and while
returning 'to the direct route negligently injured the plaintiff. A judgment in favor of the plaintiff was reversed by the court of appeals. The
court said that even if the son were the agent of his mother in having the
car repaired, so as to charge her with liability on the repair contract, he
did not have authority to delegate the driving of the car. The court also
held that the driver's deviation was great enough so that as a matter of law
the owner was not liable."
HUGH A. Ross

APPELLATE PROCEDURE
A number of cases reported during the year 1954, having to do with
various phases of appellate procedure indicate that Ohio courts are continuing to regard problems of procedure as important, 'but, nevertheless, as
providing an adjective function only, as a kind of super-structure for the
substantive law of the cases. None of the cases reviewed, with one
possible exception, announce any novel development in the attitude of the
courts with regard to procedure, -but a number of cases clarify and accent
the views of the Ohio courts set forth in earlier opinions.
The supreme court, in Connelly v. Balkwill,' reconsidered the bothersome question of whether an action is legal and, therefore, appealable on
questions of law only, or equitable and appealable on questions of law and
fact, and clarified at least one rule with regard to such determination. In
this case, a shareholders' action against several defendants, a unanimous
court held that a money judgment in favor of the plaintiffs could result
only (1) after establishment of a fiduciary relationship between them and the
director of the corporation and a breach of duties on his part arising from
that relationship, and (2) an accounting. The court reasoned that the
action against the director in such a situation, despite the fact that a money
judgment was sought, was equitable in nature and, therefore, appealable on
questions of law and fact. It was further pointed out that the question as
to whether or not such a case should properly be appealed on questions of
'law and fact must be determined from the pleadings and the issues made
thereby, and that such determination could not be inferred by evidence introduced in the trial of the case.
In considering the appeal of a chancery proceeding, the court of appeals for Montgomery County, in the case of Toulmin v. Becket,2 ruling
'Ohio law on the "frolic and detour" problem is summarized in Note, 21 U. OF
GIN. L. REv. 156 (1952).
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upon plaintiffs' motion to refer the cause to a a referee, held that the question of reference is not jurisdictional but is procedural, that the plaintiff
was entitled to a de novo hearing. It was further held that the court of
appeals has the inherent right to order the matter referred, and that, in such
a situation, the trial of the case is controlled by the Code of Civil Procedure
applicable to the court of common pleas.
In the case of Brent v. Scale Mfg .Co.3 the common pleas court in a receivership case had found a chattel mortgage to be invalid and ordered the receiver to allow the claim of the appellant only as a general claim, from which
order the appellant appealed. The court of appeals in its opinion distinguished the facts in this situation from those presented in a number of
earlier cases which have established that ancillary orders in a receivership,
if appealable, are appealable only on questions of law. The court pointed
out that since in the instant case an equity question was involved, neither
party had the right to demand a jury.
A distinction was drawn by the court of appeals for Franklin County
between the facts in LeMaistre v. Clark' and those in the case under consideration, Fleming v. Optical Co.,, the court holding that the overruling by
the common pleas court of a demurrer to the defendants' pleas of laches
set up in their answer, was a determination of a question of fact and that,
therefore, an appeal on questions of law and fact based thereon would not
be dismissed.
In two cases argued together as State ex rel. Raydel v. Raible,0 the court
of appeals for Cuyahoga County considered a case which was before that
court on questions of law only and held that in this situation the question
of what the court would or would not do if it were sitting as the trial judge
was not present. The only questions for the court to decide are whether
the judgment of the trial court was manifestly against the weight of the
evidence, whether that court committed an abuse of discretion, or whether
it committed prejudicial error in the application of the law. Therefore,
the case might not be tried de novo, as contended by the appellant.
In several cases reported during the year, the courts again considered
the elements of an appealable order. In Gray v. Youngstown funicipal
Railway Company,' the supreme court refers to its previous holdings that,
'160 Ohio St 430, 116 N.E.2d 701 (1954).
'94 Ohio App. 524, 115 N.E.2d 705 (1953).
'66 Ohio L Abs. 259, 116 N.E.2d 761 (Ohio App. 1952).
'142 Ohio St. 1, 50 N.E.2d 331 (1943).
'67 Ohio L. Abs. 126, 118 N.E.2d 920 (Ohio App. 1951).
'117 N.E.2d 480 (Ohio App. 1954), appedl dism'd, 162 Ohio St. 74, 120 N.E.2d
590 (1954).
'160 NE.2d 511, 117 N.E.2d 27 (1954).
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where in the course of the trial of a case a defendant appropriately moves
for a directed verdict, which is overruled with a verdict later being rendered
for the defendant, and plaintiff's motion for a new trial is thereafter sustained, there emerges from such sequence of events a final appealable order.
In the instant case this sequence had also occurred, but in addition the defendant had moved for a judgment on the evidence following the granting
of the plaintiffs motion for a new trial, defendant's motion being overruled. The court held that in this situation the defendant's motion in
effect constituted merely a renewal of the motions for a directed verdict
made during the trial, and that, when the plaintiff's motion for a new trial
was sustained, the resulting order was final and appealable.
In a nuisance and negligence action by land owners for damage caused
by gasoline leakage," defendant's demurrer on several grounds was sustained and plaintiffs appealed. The court of appeals overruled a motion to
dismiss the appeal for the reason that the order appealed from was not a
-final order, and then certified the record for review and final judgment
-because of conflict, an appeal as a matter of right being taken as well. The
supreme court found that the order of the court of appeals, which overruled
the motion to dismiss the appeal, did not determine the question and it
was not, therefore, a final order from which an appeal might be taken.
The so-called two-issue rule is again discussed from the standpoint of
the consideration of a jury charge in two cases: Investment & Discount,Inc.
v. YounkinP and Asteri v. City of Youngstown.30 In the latter case the
court defined the rule quite acceptably as follows:
The two-issue rule is, that error in the charge of the court, dealing exclusively with one of two or more complete and independent issues required to be presented to a jury in a civil action will be disregarded, if the
charge in respect to another independent issue which will support the verdict of the jury is free from prejudicial error, unless it is disclosed by interrogatories or otherwise that the verdict is in fact based upon the issue to
which the erroneous instruction related.

Strict conformance with statutory procedure was enjoined by the
court of appeals for Hamilton County in the case of Greenberg v. Snod.
grass Co.1 The court held that no right exists under the statutes or the
rules of courts of appeal to file a "cross appeal," each party being responsible
for perfecting his own appeal, and the time for filing notices of appeal was
not extended or curtailed by the time consumed by any other party in the
filing of notice of appeal.
'Schindler v. Standard Oil Company, 162 Ohio St. 96, 120 N.E.2d 590 (1954).
'66 Ohio L Abs. 514, 118 N.E.2d 183 (Ohio App. 1954).
" 67 Ohio L. Abs. 605, 121 N.R2d 143 (Ohio App. 1954).
' 95 Ohio App. 307, 119 N.E.2d 114 (1954).

